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ABSTRACT 
When someone thanks someone for something, or advises him against 
something, or refuses something from him, his action is directed not 
merely at but to the other. He addresses the other. But is it only actions 
that exemplify this mode of directedness? This essay argues that it is not. 
 
I 
1. We can single out a class of speech acts by the following feature: they are 
directed to another. When one thanks another for something, or advises them 
against something, or refuses something from them, one speaks not (or not 
only) about them, but to them. One addresses them. This is a relation that one 
stands in to them. To understand these acts is (inter alia) to understand this 
relation. More fully, it is is to understand a neglected manner or mode of de re 
intentionality: a manner of relational directedness that is not merely 
directedness at a particular object, but directedness to (a fellow) subject.  
 2. How should we understand this manner of intentionality? We find it 
exemplified in intentional actions—specifically, in speech acts—such as those 
just mentioned. An intentional action is a realisation or an execution of a 
 
 
practical thought—an intention, or volition, or desire. Here, then, is a 
suggestion: only when a suitable practical thought is realised is this manner of 
intentionality exemplified; outside of the context of an intentional action of the 
relevant sort (such as a speech act), it is not to be found.  
 3. My central aim in this essay is to undermine this suggestion. I will outline 
an influential account of intentional actions that exhibit this mode of 
intentionality—an account due to Jennifer Hornsby.1 And I will suggest that it is 
a consequence of this account that this mode of intentionality must be 
exhibited not only in realised practical thoughts of the sort the account 
articulates, but in other contexts too; specifically, in unrealised practical 
thoughts—pure intentions, or volitions, or desires.2  
 
II 
 
4. Let us call the intentional actions that Hornsby’s account accounts for 
actions of address. For there to be an action of this sort, the following 
conditions must be satisfied: first, there must be two subjects—an addressor, X, 
and an addressee, Y; second, X must have a volition to address Y—X must try to 
address Y;3 third, Y must recognise that X is trying to address Y—only if Y 
recognises this is X’s practical thought realised.4  
 5. What is the content of this practical thought—this volition? Specifically, 
how does it represent Y? X might express this thought by saying “I am trying to 
 
 
address ... ” (for example, “I am trying to advise ... against eating margarine”). 
In the thought X thereby expresses, what manner of representation of Y takes 
the place of the dots?  
 6. It cannot be a merely general representation—“I am trying to address 
another”. X is not merely trying to address an other—any old other—but a 
particular other, Y.  
 7. We might think we can deal with this by introducing, into the content of 
the practical thought, a demonstrative element that serves to single out Y from 
the manifold of subjects—“I am trying to address this person”. That is an 
element of singular thought constituted by perception: it is through perceiving 
Y—standing to Y in that relation—that X singles out Y in this way. And it can 
seem to be exactly what we need.  
 8. But this content seems to be inadequate, by the lights of Hornsby’s 
account. For her account holds that, for the volition to be realised, Y must 
recognise that X is trying to address Y. And it seems clear how this thought—
Y’s recognition—represents Y. It does not represent Y in the perceptual-
demonstrative manner, as this person. (Perhaps we can imagine recherché cases 
in which it does; but in the typical case, it does not—and that is all we need be 
concerned with here.) It rather represents Y in the first personal manner; it is 
the thought that Y could express by saying “X is trying to address me”—the 
thought that X is trying to address Y herself, as we might say.5  
 
 
 9. This thought, however, does not merely represent Y in this manner; it 
represents X’s volition as itself representing Y in this manner. And this thought 
is not merely a thought; it is recognition—and so, knowledge. So, the way it 
represents X’s volition as representing Y must be the way that X’s volition 
represents Y. X’s practical thought must represent Y as Y herself—it must 
represent Y in the very manner (what I earlier called “the first personal manner”) 
through which Y’s recognition itself represents Y. But according to the above 
suggestion, X’s practical thought represents Y, not in this way, but precisely in 
the perceptual-demonstrative way. Given this, Y’s thought is not knowledge; it 
represents X as having a volition that X does not have. To have a thought about 
X’s volition that is knowledge, Y would have to think, instead, that X is trying to 
address this person. But this cannot be the thought that Y’s recognition 
consists in, if Y’s recognition represents Y in the first personal way, for Y could 
endorse that thought and still wonder “Is he trying to address me?” Y’s 
recognition is knowledge of how X’s volition represents Y; so, if Y’s recognition 
represents Y in this way, so does X’s volition.  
 10. The upshot is that, because Y’s recognition does represent Y in the 
first personal manner, so does X’s volition. The verbal expression for this 
manner of representation, on Y’s lips, as it applies to Y, is “me”. On X’s lips, its 
verbal expression, as it applies to Y, is “you”. So, the answer to the question of 
§3 is—“I am trying to address you”. This is not a perceptual-demonstrative way 
of thinking. And yet, just like such a manner of thinking, it is an element of 
 
 
singular thought. It is the first person way of thinking. What is distinctive about 
this practical thought is that it thinks in this way, not merely of the subject of 
the thought, but of another subject. So, there is something misleading about 
simply calling this the first person way of thinking. It is equally the second 
person way.  
 11. The difficulty for the suggestion (of §2) can now be stated. X’s volition 
to address Y, whether it is realised in action or not, is such as to represent Y—
the one to whom the putative act of address is directed—in the first/second 
person manner; it represents Y in the manner expressible by X with “you”, and 
by Y with “me”. Such a volition just is an exemplification of the mode of de re 
intentionality which is the topic of this essay. In having this volition, X does not 
merely think about or of Y; X thinks towards Y. Directedness to a fellow subject 
is a property of the practical thoughts that inform speech acts, whether or not 
these thoughts are realised in intentional actions. So, it cannot be that the 
present mode of intentionality is exemplified merely in realised practical 
thought; it must be exemplified in pure practical thought as well.  
 12. We can put the point by saying that our topic is a mode of 
intentionality which is not merely de re, but de se, and de se towards another—
for X thinks of Y as Y herself; X’s thought represents Y in the very manner that 
Y represents Y when Y thinks of herself in that manner which she can express 
with “me”. And this is a manner that can be exemplified not just in intentional 
actions—such as speech acts—but also in pure practical thoughts.  
 
 
 
III 
13. This conclusion opens into a further issue, which I would like to end by 
raising.  
 14. It is an integral feature of Hornsby’s account that X’s volition to 
address Y is realised only if Y recognises that X intends to address Y herself. 
Combining that feature with the suggestion (of §2) yields the thought that it is 
a condition of X’s thinking towards Y—of X’s thinking of Y in the first/second 
person manner—that Y recognises that X thinks of her in this manner.6 For only 
if she so recognises this is X’s volition realised, and, according to the suggestion 
(of §2), only if X’s volition is realised is our manner of de re/de se intentionality 
exemplified—the manner that is X’s thinking towards Y. Of course, it cannot be 
right that the manner is exemplified only if X’s volition is realised; it is 
exemplified even if X’s volition remains pure. And perhaps this condition should 
be weakened so that it says merely that Y is able to recognise that X thinks of 
her in this manner. But something like this seems needed in order to distinguish 
the present mode of de re/de se intentionality from the mode of de re 
intentionality exemplified in perceptual-demonstrative thinking: in both, it is a 
condition of the mode’s exemplification that the object thought about in this 
manner exists; but in the former, there is the further condition that the object 
is a subject who is able to recognise that she is thought about in this manner, 
and therefore is able to think of herself as herself.  
 
 
 15. But this raises a question. It seems that X can have a pure practical 
thought directed towards Y even if X does not engage in any overt addressive 
actions, or indeed in any overt behaviour at all which is in any sense informed by 
the thought at issue. And yet, it is a condition of X’s having such a de re/de se 
thought about Y that Y is able to recognise that she is thought of by X in this 
way—whether the thought is realised in action, or expressed in behaviour, or 
not. How is this possible? For there to be something for Y to recognise, X’s 
thought must be in some sense publically available. But how could X’s thought 
be publically available, if it is not expressed either in addressive actions, or in 
non-intentional but still expressive behaviour (such as “pain-behaviour”) on X’s 
part?  
 16. It is an assumption of this difficulty that (as we might put it) X has (or 
is) a body: X is present in the public world, and is capable of realising thoughts 
in intentional action and expressing thoughts in behaviour. The difficulty is that 
it seems that X can have thoughts towards another that are neither so realised 
nor so expressed—and yet are such as to be apprehensible by the one to whom 
they are directed nonetheless. It cannot be through X (or his body’s) doing 
anything to make these thoughts publically available that they are made 
available—be it moving in distinctive ways, or striking distinctive poses, either 
of which might be considered manifestations of the thoughts’ presence.7 How 
then can X (or his body) make them available? The answer is: not by doing 
anything, but simply by being. It is not through engaging in action, or having a 
 
 
distinctive gait etc., that X (or his body) makes his thought available to Y, but 
simply through being (or having) a body with the kind of articulation that he (his 
body) has.  
 17. This was the view of J.G. Fichte—it is central to his Foundations of 
Natural Right. And it seems to be a view we need. It says that having (or being) 
a body is, as such, the expression of a thought directed towards anyone with 
the ability to recognise that they are being thought towards. As we might put 
it: simply in having (or being) the bodies we do (or are), we think towards 
anyone who is able to acknowledge our address in return. Address is not merely 
a character of intentional actions. It is to be found wherever thinking towards 
another is to be found. And thinking towards another, the recognisable actuality 
that it is, is to be found wherever there is a body with the kind of articulation 
that our bodies (we) have. The human body is an act of address.8  
 18. In the context of contemporary Anglophone philosophy—and perhaps 
in other contexts too9—this is a highly unfamiliar idea. But—as far as I can see—
it is an idea that we need, in order to make sense of the special mode of de 
re/de se intentionality that is our topic. We began by trying to understand this 
manner by thinking through Hornsby’s account of addressive action. We have 
ended with Fichte’s conception of the body. 
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  merely	  that	  Y	  recognises	  that	  X	  is	  thinking	  of	  her	  herself.	  	  7.	   On	  this	  topic,	  see	  (of	  course)	  John	  McDowell,	  “Criteria,	  Defeasibility,	  and	  Knowledge”	  (1982),	  reprinted	  in	  his	  
Meaning,	  Knowledge,	  and	  Reality	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  	  8.	   J.G.	  Fichte,	  Foundations	  of	  Natural	  Right,	  trans.	  Michael	  Baur	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000):	  “…	  my	  body	  would	  have	  to	  exercise	  an	  efficacy	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  shape	  and	  its	  mere	  existence	  in	  space	  [an	  influence]	  exercised	  upon	  a	  rational	  being	  as	  rational”	  (p.	  70).	  I	  think	  a	  proper	  development	  of	  the	  present	  suggestion	  would	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  act	  of	  address	  is,	  not	  something	  that	  happens	  only	  at	  certain	  times,	  but	  the	  time-­‐general	  character	  of	  the	  human	  body	  as	  such	  (“this	  appearance	  of	  my	  body	  must	  be	  such	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  understood	  or	  comprehended	  except	  under	  the	  presupposition	  that	  I	  am	  a	  rational	  being”,	  p.	  71).	  For	  a	  development	  of	  this	  idea,	  see	  Sebastian	  Rödl,	  “Intentional	  Transaction”,	  Philosophical	  Explorations,	  vol.	  17.,	  no.	  3	  (2004):	  304-­‐316.	  	  	  9.	   It	  does	  not	  figure,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  recent	  exchange	  between	  Dreyfus	  and	  McDowell.	  See	  Hubert	  L.	  Dreyfus,	  “Overcoming	  the	  Myth	  of	  the	  Mental:	  How	  Philosophers	  Can	  Profit	  from	  the	  Phenomenology	  of	  Everyday	  Experience”,	  Proceedings	  and	  Addresses	  of	  the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association,	  vol.	  79,	  no.	  2	  (November	  2005),	  and	  John	  McDowell,	  “What	  Myth?”,	  Inquiry,	  vol.	  50,	  no.	  4	  (2007):	  338–351.	  	  
 
